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: Case No. 920830-CA
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:

GREGORY MORRIS MATISON, aka
GERALD MORRIS, aka MORRIS
GREGORY MATISON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana), a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the officer have a reasonable suspicion of

other criminal activity to support the investigative detention of
defendant beyond the scope of detention permitted for a traffic
stop?
This issue is one of fact under which the trial court's
findings will be reversed only if they are clearly erroneous.
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987).

Factual

findings are not clearly erroneous unless they are against the
clear weight of the evidence, or the appellate court reaches a

"definite and firm conviction" that the trial court was mistaken.
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990),
2.

Was defendant's consent to search the car he was

driving given voluntarily?
The question of whether or not a consent to search is
voluntary is a mixed question of fact and law; this Court may
reverse the trial court's factual findings only if they are
clearly erroneous, however this Court reviews the ultimate
conclusion of voluntariness for correctness.

State v. Thurman,

846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993) (citing Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2058-60 (1973)).
3.

Did the trial court correctly find that defendant

lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched
luggage when defendant presented conflicting evidence to support
his assertion of a claim in that luggage?
The trial court's determination of whether or not
defendant demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search is one of fact, that is reviewed
for clear error.

State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App.

1991).
4.

Has defendant demonstrated that this Court should

depart from the well established federal standard for determining
voluntariness of consent to search by requiring officers to
inform suspects that under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution they may refuse consent?

2

The interpretation of a constitutional provision
presents a question of law that this Court reviews for
correctness.

State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App.

1991).
5.

If this Court formulates a new requirement for law

enforcement should that rule only be applied prospectively?
This issue is governed by the same standard of review
as issue 5.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana), a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (1990) (R. 1).
Defendant moved to suppress the marijuana seized from
luggage in the trunk of a vehicle he was driving at the time of
the traffic stop (R. 22-23, 50-80).

Following an evidentiary

hearing (R. 120-62), the trial court denied defendant's motion
(R. 34-37) (a complete copy of the court's findings is contained
in Addendum A ) .
The court tried the case based on the transcript of the
suppression hearing and a video of the investigatory stop (R.

3

167-71)-1

The court found defendant guilty based on the

stipulated evidence (R. 174). However, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 1992), the trial court reduced defendant's
conviction one degree and sentenced defendant to zero to five
years in the Utah State Prison and imposed a $5,000 fine (Tr.
Jan. 19, 1993 at 11). The court suspended the sentence and fine
on condition that defendant serve one year in the Sevier County
Jail subject to review after 90 days with a reduction of the fine
to $1,250 and the statutory surcharge (Tr. Jan. 19, 1993 at 12).
The trial court stayed defendant's sentence during the pendency
of this appeal (Tr. Jan. 19, 1993 at 14).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law accurately recite the facts pertinent to this appeal (R. 3438) (Addendum A).

The court's findings are therefore reproduced

here, adding citations to the transcript of the preliminary
hearing,2 transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress
and to a video tape of the stop (Exhibit 1):
1. On January 14, 1992, Deputy Phil Barney
was traveling to the Salina interchange of I70 when he observed a vehicle which had just
come off the eastbound lanes of 1-70 at such
exit (R. 100, 126).

2

The parties stipulated that the material seized was marijuana
and that there were 138,25 pounds of it (R. 167-69).
2

The transcripts of the preliminary hearing and arraignment
were not part of the stipulated evidence heard at trial.
However, Judge Don V. Tibbs presided at all hearings involving
the defendant. Defendant relies on these transcripts in his
brief (Br. App. at 5) and the State will as well.
4

2. Deputy Barney observed the vehicle "fish
tail" (R. 100, 101, 127) as it came onto the
access road from the freeway and then the
vehicle stopped at a gas station/convenience
store (R. 100, 101, 128).
3. Deputy Barney drove up to the freeway
underpass where the vehicle had been out of
control to determine whether the action was
the result of icy conditions and observed
that the road was dry (R. 100, 101, 102,
127) .
4. The officer observed that the driver of
the vehicle was still stopped at the business
establishment and commenced traffic
enforcement activities on 1-70 east of Salina
(R. 102, 128).
5. Upon subsequently observing the vehicle
traveling eastbound out of Salina and knowing
that there are no services for 110 miles in
such direction (R. 129), Deputy Barney
decided to stop the vehicle to determine
whether the driver was impaired or why the
driver was unable to control the vehicle at
the Salina interchange (R. 102, 129).
6. The officer stopped the vehicle at 1:33
p.m. as shown on the video tape recording of
the scene of the stop (Exhibit 1).
7. When the officer approached the
Defendant's vehicle, the Defendant asked,
"What am I being stopped for? Am I
speeding?" (Exhibit 1, R. 131).
8. Deputy Barney responded by indicating
that he would explain in a moment and asked
for the license and registration to the
vehicle (Exhibit 1, R. 102, 131).
9. At 1:34:14 p.m., Deputy Barney explained
the reason for the stop and the Defendant
stated that he had been having trouble with
his cruise control and that was why he was
unable to control the vehicle (Exhibit 1, R.
133) .
10. Deputy Barney had at this point smelled
the odor of fresh ground coffee, an
ingredient commonly used to mask the odor of
5

raw marijuana (R. 106, 132), and noted the
extreme nervousness3 of the Defendant who
had offered an unreasonable explanation of
his traveling in a vehicle for which he was
not the owner (Exhibit 1, R. 103, 104).
11. Deputy Barney asked if the vehicle
contained firearms or drugs (Exhibit 1, R.
132, 133-34) and after receiving a negative
response (Exhibit 1) asked, "May I look in
the vehicle?" (Exhibit 1, R. 105, 134).
12. The Defendant consented at 1:34:35 p.m.
(Exhibit 1). 4
13. At 1:35:50 p.m., Deputy Barney asked the
Defendant, "Would you pop the trunk,"
(Exhibit 1, R. 106-07, 134) and the Defendant
opened the trunk (Exhibit 1, R. 134).
14. Upon observing the suitcases in the
trunk (Exhibit 1, R. 108-09) and smelling the
suitcase (R. 109, 134), Deputy Barney
handcuffed the Defendant and arrested him at
1:36:38 p.m. (Exhibit 1, R. 109, 134).
15. At 1:38:02, Deputy Barney opened one of
the cases sufficiently to observe marijuana
(Exhibit 1, R. 108-09, 134).
16. The vehicle was found to contain 138.25
pounds of marijuana (R. 106, 168).

3

The trial court's reliance on nervousness is misplaced.
Although it may be probative in some circumstances, in this case
there was neither testimony about the degree of defendant's
nervousness as compared to typical cases, nor testimony about the
manifestations of nervousness. Accordingly, that fact does not
contribute to a reasonable suspicion in this case.
4

0fficer Barney asked about the contents of defendant's
pants pockets when he observed a bulge in defendant's pocket.
Apparently he was concerned that defendant might be carrying a
weapon (Exhibit 1). See State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092
(Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J. concurring) (police officer was
justified in frisking an individual suspected of transporting
narcotics because such individuals "might be armed to protect
themselves").
6

Based on the above findings of fact, th^ court denied
defendant's motion to suppress.

The court further determined:

1. The Defendant submitted no evidence or
testimony regarding his claim of interest in
the substance seized or the contents of the
vehicle and he lacks standing to challenge
the search.
2. The initial traffic stop of the vehicle
was pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement
function.
3. The Defendant, upon being asked about the
presence of firearms or drugs, voluntarily
consented to open the vehicle for inspection.
4. The officer used no threats or coercion
and the Defendant's actions were voluntary.
(R. 34-38) (Addendum A ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's implicit finding that Deputy Barney's
continued investigative detention of defendant beyond the scope
of a traffic stop was supported by a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity is amply supported by the record.

The trial

court correctly found that defendant voluntarily consented to the
search of the vehicle and trunk based on the fact that there was
no coercion or threats made by Deputy Barney.

After defendant

opened the trunk for Deputy Barney, the odor of marijuana and
known masking agents established probable cause for a warrantless
search of the luggage in the trunk.

Moreover, even if this Court

determines that the consent is somehow tainted, the trial court
correctly concluded that defendant failed to meet his burden of
showing an expectation of privacy in the luggage. Accordingly,
defendant may not challenge the legality of the search.
7

This Court should not depart from the well established
federal standard for determining voluntariness of consent.
Defendant fails to demonstrate that the Utah Constitution
requires the State to show that voluntary consent can only be
given with knowledge of the right to refuse consent.
Accordingly, this Court should reject defendant's expansive
interpretation of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
If this Court creates such a rule, that rule should apply
prospectively and have no retroactive affect.
ARGUMENT5
POINT I
THE OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT
DEFENDANT WAS TRANSPORTING NARCOTICS WHEN HE
ASKED ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS BEYOND THE SCOPE
OF THE INITIAL TRAFFIC STOP.
The trial court's determination that the stop and
detention of defendant were supported by reasonable suspicion is
not clearly erroneous (R. 35). Indeed, defendant does not
challenge the propriety of the initial stop.
13.6

Br. of App. at

In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that he "was
5

Defendant labels his issues as focusing on article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Br. of App. at 2. However,
with the exception of his argument in Point IV, he relies on
analysis of the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution as interpreted by Utah and federal courts.
Consequently, with the exception of that issue, the State will
not analyze the issues under the Utah Constitution, but will,
like defendant, engage in fourth amendment analysis. State v.
Bobo, 803 P.2d 1269, 1273 (Utah App. 1990).
6

This position is proper in light of the undisputed facts.
Deputy Barney testified that he stopped defendant because he saw
the vehicle "fish tail as it entered US-50" (R. 127). Defendant
admitted to "fishtailing" on the videotape of the stop (Exhibit
8

detained without an articulable or reasonable suspicion that he
was involved in criminal activity [following the stop]."

Br. of

App. at 18. Defendant's analysis ignores critical trial court
findings and analysis.
An investigative detention of a vehicle "'must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop.'"

State v. Higgins, 837 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah

App. 1992) (quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)),
cert, granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah May 18, 1993); State v.
Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991).

See State v. Robinson,

797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 1990) ("[a]n officer conducting a routine
traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle
registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation;"
however, unless there is reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity beyond the traffic violation, the detention must end).
Based on this Court's caselaw, Deputy Barney's
questions about narcotics and firearms went beyond the scope of
the initial traffic stop.

State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 436

(Utah App. 1990); State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 703 (Utah App.
1992); State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah App. 1992).
However, defendant's detention beyond this initial purpose was
justified by a reasonable suspicion of additional wrongdoing.
See State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992) (an

1). Deputy Barney testified that he was concerned that defendant
might be impaired or that there might be a safety problem since
defendant was driving in a direction where there were no services
for 100 miles (Exhibit 1, R. 129).
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officer may detain an individual beyond initial purpose of stop,
"only if, during the course of the traffic stop, the officer
discovers acts which give him or her reasonable suspicion of
other more serious criminal activity").
This Court has recognized that "the odor of marijuana
x

has a distinct smell' and can alone 'satisfy the probable cause

requirement to search[.]'"

State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426

(Utah App. 1993) (quoting United States v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297
300 (10th Cir. 1991)).

See also State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969,

972-73 (Utah App. 1992) (same).

Specifically, Deputy Barney

smelled the "very heavy" odor of coffee grounds when he first
approached defendant's window (R. 132).7

The trial court found

that coffee grounds are commonly used to mask the odor of illegal
drugs (R. 36). This finding is amply supported by decisions from
other courts.

See, e.g., United States v. Olivier-Becerril, 861

F.2d 424, 425 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[ijnside the trunk the agent
found several bags of coffee . . . . The agent knew that coffee
was sometimes used to mask the odor of narcotics"); United States

7

As this Court stated in State v. Menke:
The trained law enforcement officer is in a
different position than the average citizen
in that he or she "may be able to perceive
and articulate meaning in given conduct which
would be wholly innocent to the untrained
observer. . . . The officer is entitled to
assess the facts in light of his experience."

787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting State v. Truiillo,
739 P.2d 85, 88-89 (Utah App. 1987)). Officer Barney's
undisputed experience and the articulated facts rendered the
additional questioning of defendant permissible.
10

v. Adamo, 882 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[defendants] flew
from New York to Peoria with a plastic bag containing six ounces
of cocaine sealed within a second plastic bag containing coffee
grounds, in an attempt to conceal the cocaine odor"); United
States v. Scales, 903 F.2d 765, 767 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) ("coffee
grounds are used by narcotics traffickers to disguise the odor of
drugs"); United States v. Boucher, 909 F.2d 1170, 1172 (8th Cir.
1990) ("[officer] knew [coffee grounds, air freshener, and
ammonia] are commonly used to disguise the odor of narcotics from
humans and dogs"); United States v. Padron, 657 F.Supp. 840, 84849 (D.Del. 1987) ("[d]efendants argue that it was objectively
impossible to smell the raw marijuana because it was enclosed in
plastic ziplocked bags, surrounded by coffee grounds"); People v.
Small, 252 Cal.Rptr. 41, 43 (Cal.App.3 Dist. 1988)
([m]ethamphetamine found with "several damp coffee filters that
contained a strong odor"); Kemp v. State, 411 S.E.2d 880, 881
(Ga.App. 1991) ("[b]ecause the package emitted a strong odor of
coffee, a substance drug dealers sometimes use to mask the odor
of cocaine, the package was opened . . . and approximately 50 0
grams of cocaine were discovered").

The smell of a distinctive

masking agent, therefore, was sufficient under the less stringent
reasonable suspicion standard, to support Deputy Barney's
investigatory detention beyond the scope of a traffic stop.
Dudley, 847 P.2d at 426 n.l.
Defendant fails to acknowledge or challenge these
critical facts and fails to recognize their significance in
11

establishing reasonable suspicion to justify Deputy Barney's
decision to investigate the possibility of drug trafficking.

See

Br. of App. Point II. By ignoring the trial court's factual
findings, and the evidence in support of those findings,
defendant fails to demonstrate clear error in either the trial
court's credibility determinations, or its implicit finding of
reasonable suspicion for the continued detention beyond the
purpose of the initial traffic stop.

This Court should affirm

the trial court's ruling.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
DEFENDANT CONSENTED TO DEPUTY BARNEY'S
REQUEST TO SEARCH THE CAR. THE TRIAL COURT'S
ULTIMATE CONCLUSION THAT THIS CONSENT WAS
VOLUNTARY IS CORRECT.
In Points III and IV of his brief, defendant asserts
the trial court erred in finding that he voluntarily consented to
the search of the car or its contents.

Br. of App. at 19-33.

Alternatively, assuming his consent was voluntarily given,
defendant complains that the trial court failed to determine
whether his consent was sufficiently attenuated from the alleged
illegal stop.

Br. of App. 33-37.

Defendant's contentions lack

merit.
A.

Standard of Review for Voluntariness of Consent

In State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993),
the supreme court resolved a split between panels of this Court
as to the appropriate standard of review of a trial court's
determination of the voluntariness of a consent to search.
12

It

held that "the trial court's ultimate conclusion that a consent
was voluntary or involuntary is to be reviewed for correctness!;]
[however,] [t]he trial court's underlying factual findings will
not be set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous."
846 P.2d at 1271 (citations omitted).
B.

Voluntariness Standard

A warrantless search conducted pursuant to voluntary
consent is valid under the fourth amendment.
842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1992).

State v. Sepulveda,

"*[W]hether the requisite

voluntariness exists depends on the "totality of all the
surrounding circumstances - both the characteristics of the
accused and the details" of police conduct.'"

Thurman, 846 P.2d

at 1262-63 (quoting State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah
1990), in turn quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
226 (1973)).

"[B]oth the 'characteristics of the accused' and

the 'details of police conduct' must be considered in determining
whether a defendant's consent was actually a product of his or
her free will."

Id. at 1263 (citations omitted).

The burden of

proving the voluntariness of consent falls on the prosecution.

C.

Voluntary Consent Finding is Correct

Defendant misstates the record and fails to marshal the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings underlying its
determination that the consent to search was voluntary.

He

therefore fails to demonstrate that the trial court's finding
that he consented to the search is clearly erroneous (R. 36). He
13

likewise fails to demonstrate that the trial court's ultimate
conclusion that this consent was voluntary is incorrect (R. 37).
The trial court specifically found:
12. The Defendant consented at 1:34:35 p.m.
(Exhibit 1).

3. The Defendant, upon being asked about the
presence of firearms or drugs, voluntarily
consented to open the vehicle for inspection.
4. The officer used no threats or coercion
and the Defendant's actions were voluntary.
(R. 37) , (Exhibit 1), see Addendum A.

Ignoring these findings of

the trial court, Defendant alleges:
The deputy then directed that the search be
made of the trunk. When the Appellant
hesitated, the deputy ordered him to open the
trunk. He asked the Appellant what he had to
hide. The Appellant was put in a position of
either admitting there was contraband in the
vehicle or stating that there was no good
reason why the trooper could not look in the
trunk.
Br. of App. at 23. The record is devoid of any evidence that
this description of the events is accurate.

Rather, the record

clearly shows that Deputy Barney asked defendant "Would you pop
the trunk?" (Exhibit 1), (R. 106-07, 134). He never "ordered"
defendant to open any part of the car.

Likewise, Deputy Barney

never asked defendant "what he had to hide."
(Exhibit 1).

Br. App. at 23,

Defendant's misrepresentation of the facts in this

case should lead this Court to disregard his claim of error.8
8

"Referring to matters that are not part of the record in
the trial court . . . [is] entirely inappropriate and irrelevant
to this proceeding. We do not consider such material." State v.
14

The trial court made the following findings concerning
the voluntariness of defendant's consent:

Deputy Barney asked if

he could "look in the vehicle," (R. 36) to which defendant
responded, "Yes, sir", (Exhibit 1), (R. 36). After searching the
interior, the deputy asked defendant, "would you pop the trunk?"
(Exhibit 1).

Defendant unhesitatingly opened the trunk, never

attempted to limit the scope of the search and never complained
about the scope of the search, (Exhibit 1).

Based on these

facts, the court properly concluded that "[d]efendant voluntarily
consented to the search and there is no evidence of coercion" (R.
37) .
D.

Attenuation Analysis Unnecessary

Finally, this Court need not consider defendant's
additional complaint that the trial court failed to determine
whether his consent was attenuated from the alleged illegal stop
under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
33-37,

Br. of App. at

See also Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262 (clarifying Arroyo).

Defendant has not demonstrated that Deputy Barney's search
request was preceded by any illegality; thus, there was no need
for the trial court to engage in an attenuation analysis below.
Accordingly, this Court need not engage in an attenuation
analysis on appeal.

See State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 n.l

(Utah App. 1993) (attenuation analysis applies only if a prior

Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986); gge also State v.
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982) (reviewing court will
not rule on a question that depends upon alleged facts
unsupported by the record).
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police illegality exists).

If this Court determines that a prior

illegality did occur, the proper remedy is to remand this case to
the trial court in order for that court to engage in the
attenuation analysis required by Thurman.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A SUBJECTIVE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE SEARCHED
LUGGAGE. ACCORDINGLY, HE CANNOT CHALLENGE
THE PROPRIETY OF THAT SEARCH. ALTERNATIVELY,
THIS COURT MAY AFFIRM SINCE THE OFFICER HAD
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH ONCE DEFENDANT
OPENED THE TRUNK OF THE CAR.
A. The Trial Court Correctly Pound That Defendant
Did Not Demonstrate a Subjective Expectation of Privacy
in the Searched Luggage.
The trial court, after reviewing the video tape,
(Exhibit 1), the testimony of Deputy Barney, the arguments of
counsel and detailed memoranda, concluded:
1. The Defendant submitted no evidence or
testimony regarding his claim of interest in
the substance seized or the contents of the
vehicle and he lacks standing to challenge
the search.
(R. 37). 9 Defendant fails to demonstrate clear error in this

9

The State recognizes that under this Court's holding in
State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah App. 1992), that
defendant's claim that a "friend" had loaned him the car (Exhibit
1) may be sufficient to assert a subjective interest in the
interior and trunk of the car. However, defendant's failure to
demonstrate a subjective interest in the luggage where Deputy
Barney discovered the marijuana is fatal to his claim.
16

finding.10

Therefore, he cannot complain about any alleged

illegality.
In order to challenge the legality of the search,
defendant must demonstrate that the search violated his fourth
amendment rights. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421,
430 (1978)); Marshall. 791 P.2d at 886.

To meet this burden,

defendant must show that he subjectively expected that the
searched area was private to him and that this expectation was
legitimate in the view of society.

State v. Scott. No. 920601-

CA, slip op. at 4 (Utah App. October 8, 1993) (citing Katz v.
United States. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967); Rakas. 439 U.S.
at 143 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 430 n.12; Marshall. 791 P.2d at 887
(defendant's burden "to develop the relevant facts below").
After defendant opened the trunk, Deputy Barney, upon
observing the luggage, asked "Whose is this?"
"It's mine."

Deputy Barney then asked "It's all yours?"

Defendant replied "Yeah."
"Marijuana?"

Defendant replied

Deputy Barney then questioned

To this question defendant responded "No."

10

State v. Tavlor sets out a bifurcated standard of review
for this issue. "The first step involves a determination of
whether the individual has demonstrated 'a subjective expectation
of privacy in the object of the challenged search.' We review
the pertinent findings under a clearly erroneous standard." 818
P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). The ultimate
conclusion of whether or not society would recognize that
subjective expectation is then reviewed for correctness. Id.
Accord United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1248-49 (10th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Evster. 948 F.2d 1196, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1991). Therefore, when the individual fails to carry his
burden under the first prong (as defendant failed to do here),
there is no reason to reach the second prong. Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 150, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 (1978).
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However, defendant, once handcuffed, responded to the question of
"How much do you have in here?" by stating "I don't know what's
in, I don't know."
these?"

Again, when Deputy Barney asked, "Whose are

Defendant replied, "I don't know."

stated "You don't know whose they are?"

Deputy Barney then

Defendant responded, "I

don't know, well, those suitcases are Jerry's but some of the
stuff was in the trunk of the car."

(Exhibit 1).

During the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant
presented no other evidence to support his claim of a subjective
interest in the luggage and marijuana in the trunk of the car.
This Court in Scott recognized that where a defendant fails to
demonstrate "an interest in the property seized, he has not
demonstrated an expectation of privacy and thus has no standing
to challenge the search."

Scott, slip op. at 4 (emphasis added).

As this Court stated in Marshall,
[defendant] has the ultimate burden of proof
to establish that his fourth amendment rights
were violated or, to put it otherwise, that
he had an expectation of privacy in the . . .
articles seized.
791 P.2d at 886. Here, the trial court found that defendant's
ambiguous statements were insufficient to meet this burden of
proof.

This failure demonstrated defendant's lack of a

subjective interest of privacy in the luggage where Deputy Barney
found the marijuana.
On appeal defendant reasserts his claim that he was a
"bailee" of the luggage and therefore had a legitimate privacy
interest the luggage.

See Br. of App. 6-13 and (R. 51-56).
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However, defendant never presented any evidence to support his
claim that a bailment had been created between himself and
someone else.

He merely asserted in his supporting memorandum,

and asserts again on appeal, that he was the bailee of the
luggage.

Br. of App. at 6-13 and (R. 51-56).
This Court has recognized that:
The factor determining whether the
transaction is a bailment is whether the
bailor surrenders possession and control over
the property to the owner of the premises
where the property is placed.

McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 304 (Utah App. 1992).
Defendant failed to show the existence of any "bailor" in this
case.11
As this Court stated in Scott.
Since the defendant did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy, he has no standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the
search. Therefore, the trial court properly
denied his motion to suppress the discovered
evidence.
Scott, slip op. at 5-6.

Defendant fails to demonstrate that the

trial court incorrectly concluded that he had no standing to
challenge the search of the luggage.

This Court should affirm

that conclusion.

^Defendant cites to United States v. Benitez-Arrecruin, 973
F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that possession of
luggage as a bailee is sufficient to find an expectation of
privacy. However, defendant ignores that the Tenth Circuit held
that "[a] proponent of a motion to suppress who relies upon the
lawful possession factor bears the burden of presenting at least
some evidence that his or her possession was lawful." Id. at
828. Defendant failed to present any evidence that he lawfully
possessed the luggage.
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B. This Court May Affirm the Trial Court's Denial of
the Motion to Suppress on the Alternative Ground that
Deputy Barney had Probable Cause to Search the Luggage
Once Defendant Opened the Trunk.
Even if this Court concludes that defendant established
an expectation of privacy in the searched luggage, this Court
should affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress
on the alternative ground that the search of the luggage was
reasonable based on probable cause.

State v. Potter, No. 920579,

slip op. at 3-4 (Utah App. September 8, 1993) ("we may affirm on
any proper ground").

Once Deputy Barney smelled marijuana along

with known masking agents, he had probable cause to search the
source of those odors.

The smell of marijuana alone created

probable cause allowing a warrantless search of the luggage in
the trunk.
Deputy Barney testified that after defendant opened the
trunk, "There was a heavy smell again of, aside of coffee
grounds, lying--oh, the sight of coffee grounds, lying all across
the trunk, also a smell of--later identified as fabric softener,
these type sheets that are put in a dryer. And I could also
smell marijuana."

(R. 134). This Court has recognized that "the

odor of marijuana xhas a distinct smell' and can alone "satisfy
the probable cause requirement to search[.]/lf

State v. Dudley,

847 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting United States v.
Morin, 949 F.2d 297 300 (10th Cir. 1991)).

See also State v.

Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 972-73 (Utah App. 1992) (same).
Moreover, the odors of known masking agents provided further
indication of illegal activity.

As this Court stated in State v.
20

Bartlev, "[i]t is well-established that probable cause for arrest
may arise from an officer's sense of smell."
(Utah App. 1989) . See footnote 6, supra.

784 P.2d 1231, 1236

See also United States

v. Medina, 543 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The officer had
probable cause to search the car after appellant ran the
checkpoint, after his car interior smelled of air freshener, and
after he denied having a key to the trunk."); United States v.
Reyna, 546 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1977) ("probable cause to search
was established . . . by the discernible odor of air-freshener in
the car, the nervousness of the passenger, and the unbelievable
story told by the driver about the missing trunk key."); United
States v. Koeniq, 856 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Cocaine is
ofttimes packed in laundry products to mask its smell. . . .
wrapped in fabric softener sheets, he found two transparent
plastic bags containing white powder"); United States v. Rich,
992 F.2d 502, 504 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The suitcase contained
marijuana packed in fabric softener tissues"); State v. Johnson,
516 So.2d 1015, 1017 (Fla.App. 5 Dist. 1987) ("The trooper
explained that fabric softener was often used to conceal the odor
of marijuana"); State v. Rosboroucrh, 615 P.2d 84, 85 (Ha. 1980)
("The chemical odor emanated from two plastic air fresheners, an
apparent attempt to disguise the scent of marijuana"); State v.
Thompson. 543 So.2d 1077, 1079 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1989) ("five years
of experience in traffic stops and drug arrests had taught him
that these aromas [fabric softener or air freshener] were
sometimes used in an attempt to mask the odor of marijuana");
21

State v. Cabanas, 594 So.2d 404, 406 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991) ("a
heavy odor of fabric softener is sometimes used to mask illegal
drugs in order to thwart detection by drug detector dogs"); State
v. Garza, 853 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Mo.App.S.D. 1993) ("the air
fresheners were there to disguise the odor of marijuana");
Murillo v. State, 850 S.W.2d 198, 199 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1993) ("[Officer] opened the bag and noticed a strong odor
of fabric softener which he had learned from past investigations
is used to cover up the smell of narcotics"); State v. Earl, 716
P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1986) (factors suggesting defendant was a
drug courier included fact that car contained "strong air
fresheners").
Since Deputy Barney had probable cause to search at
this time, the issue of whether defendant's consent to search
included the luggage becomes moot.
971-72.

See Naisbitt. 827 P.2d at

This Court can, therefore, affirm the trial court's

denial of the motion to suppress based on this alternative
ground.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE ANY REASON
THAT THIS COURT SHOULD DEPART FROM THE WELL
ESTABLISHED FEDERAL STANDARD FOR DETERMINING
VOLUNTARINESS OF CONSENT TO SEARCH BY
REQUIRING OFFICERS TO INFORM SUSPECTS THAT
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION THEY MAY REFUSE
CONSENT.
The question of whether article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution requires that the State prove that a person was
aware of his right to decline a request to search before a
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consent to that search may be deemed valid was previously raised
in State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1990).

In Bobo,

this Court refused to reach the issue because of inadequate
briefing.

Id.

However, in a footnote, the Bobo court suggested

a three part analysis to employ when advancing novel state
constitutional arguments: 1) Counsel should offer analysis of the
unique context in which Utah's constitution developed; 2) Counsel
should demonstrate that state appellate courts regularly
interpret even textually similar state constitutional provisions
in a manner different from their federal counterparts; and 3)
Citation should be made to authority from other states supporting
the particular construction urged by counsel. Id. at 1272 n.5.
An analysis of defendant's proposed construction of article I,
section 14 demonstrates that there is no basis for departing from
the federal standard for determining voluntariness of consent to
a search.
1. The
Article
Federal
Consent

Historical Context Surrounding the Adoption of
I, Section 14 Weighs Against Departing from the
Standard for Determining Voluntariness of a
to Search.

The first factor to consider in advancing a state
constitutional argument is the historical context in which the
particular provision under review was adopted.

Defendant argues

that because the early Mormon pioneers came to Utah to avoid
religious and political persecution, and that because the
practice of polygamy prompted the passage of federal criminal
laws that resulted in the prosecution of Utah residents and the
forfeiture of their property, "it is unquestionable that the Utah
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State Constitution was intended to limit the power of the
government to a greater extent than the same federal
constitutional provisions."

Br. of App. at 27. Because many

framers of the Utah Constitution were polygamists whose homes had
been searched by federal anti-polygamy agents, the argument goes,
they must have contemplated broader state search and seizure
protections than were provided under the federal constitution.
While at first glance defendant's argument may have some appeal,
closer scrutiny reveals that it is significantly flawed.
If the framers of Utah's constitution were dissatisfied
with the scope of protection provided by the fourth amendment,
they would have drafted a textually different search and seizure
provision instead of adopting language that is nearly identical
to that of the fourth amendment.

Instead, the framers drafted an

entirely separate state constitutional provision for the
protection of religious freedom: "No inhabitant of this State
shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or
her mode of religious worship . . . ." Utah Const, art. III.12
See K. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure
Jurisprudence Under the Utah State Constitution, Article I,
Section 14, 17 Utah J. Contemp. L. 267, 280 (1991).

Having thus

specifically protected religious practices, it is reasonable to

12

Article III then goes on to state, "but polygamous or
plural marriages are forever prohibited." Having thus rejected
the very practice that prompted the resented federal searches, it
is reasonable to believe that the drafters of the state
constitution assumed that those searches would become less of a
problem.
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believe that the drafters of Utah's constitution saw no reason to
expand state protections against searches that were unrelated to
such practices.
Moreover, relying on the "views" of one religious
segment and giving that group's views conclusive weight in
interpreting the Utah constitution is problematic.

A careful

reading of the historical record shows that "Mormons were
particularly disturbed by the federal criminal machinery that was
responsible for criminal prosecutions."

Cassell, The Mysterious

Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State
Constitutions:

The Utah Example, P.63, unpublished article to be

published in Fall 1993 Utah Law Review.

To the extent that the

historical experience of Mormons is particularly relevant, it
certainly does not argue for a more expansive interpretation of
restrictions for State law enforcement.

Id.

A review of the history of article I, section 14
provides additional support for the proposition that the framers
of Utah's constitution did not intend Utah's search and seizure
provision to be interpreted differently than its federal
counterpart.13

The development of Utah's search and seizure

provision prior to the adoption of article I, section 14 reflects
13

The only reference to Article I, Section 14 at the
Constitutional Convention of 1895 was as follows:
The Chairman:

Gentlemen, we will take up section 14,

Section 14 was read and passed without amendment.
1 Official Report of Proceedings and Debates of the Convention:
1895 319 (1898) .
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a steady movement by the framers toward adoption of the precise
wording of the fourth amendment.

(See Addendum B of this brief

for a textual history of article I, section 14.)

With each

progressive revision of Utah's search and seizure provision, its
language became more similar to that of the fourth amendment.
Indeed, only its original 1849 version is significantly different
from the fourth amendment.

The drafters jettisoned that language

in 1872 in favor of language very similar to that of the fourth
amendment.

Each successive revision from that point forward

constituted only minor stylistic changes until the current
provision, which is virtually identical to the fourth amendment,
was adopted in 1895.
That the framers of the Utah Constitution adopted
language so similar to the fourth amendment is significant
because it suggests an intent to provide protections equivalent
to those provided under the federal provision.

In contrast, it

is obvious that when they intended to provide more expansive
protections than those provided under the federal constitution,
the framers of the Utah Constitution signaled that intent by
drafting provisions that were textually distinct from those of
the federal constitution.

For instance, the provisions of Utah's

constitution dealing with religious freedom and other inalienable
rights are very different from their federal counterparts.
Utah Const, art. I, §§ 1 & 4.

See

Instead of merely adopting the

language of the first amendment, the framers of Utah's
constitution drafted detailed religious freedom and separation of
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church and state provisions.

Ibid.

Had the framers similarly

intended the state's search and seizure provision to provide
protections different from those afforded to citizens under the
federal constitution, then article I, section 14 surely would
feature more detailed and expansive language than that of the
fourth amendment.
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this Court have
claimed that the drafters of article I, section 14 intended that
it be construed differently than the fourth amendment.

Indeed,

Utah's court have implicitly recognized that there is nothing in
Utah's history, and especially the history of article I, section
14, that justifies departing from the federal search and seizure
standards developed under the fourth amendment.

Instead of

relying upon the historical context in which article I, section
14 was adopted as the basis for rejecting federal search and
seizure law, Utah's courts have departed from the federal
standards only in the limited circumstances articulated in State
v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), as discussed in the next
section.
2. Although the Language of Article I, Section 14 is
Nearly Identical to that of the Fourth Amendment, the
Utah Provision May Be Interpreted Differently From the
Federal Provision Under the Narrow Circumstances
Articulated in State v. Watts.
According to Bobo. the second factor to analyze in
developing novel state constitutional arguments is the appellate
treatment of state constitutional provisions that are textually
similar to their federal counterparts.
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The Utah Supreme Court

has already articulated its position with respect to how article
I, section 14 should be interpreted.

As explained in State v.

Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988):
Article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution reads nearly verbatim with the
fourth amendment, and thus this Court had
never drawn any distinctions between the
protections afforded by the respective
constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court
has always considered the protections
afforded to be one and the same.
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221.

See also State v. Jasso, 439 P.2d 844

(Utah 1968); State v. Criscola, 444 P.2d 517 (Utah 1968); State
v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976) (all construing article I,
section 14 as providing the same scope of protection as the
fourth amendment).
However, the Utah Supreme Court in Watts also noted:
In declining to depart in this case from our
consistent refusal heretofore to interpret
article I, section 14 of our constitution in
a manner different from the fourth amendment
to the federal constitution, we have by no
means ruled out the possibility of doing so
in some future case. Indeed, choosing to
give the Utah Constitution a somewhat
different construction may prove to be an
appropriate method for insulating this
state's citizens from the vagaries of
inconsistent interpretations given the fourth
amendment by the federal courts.
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8 (citations omitted).
Since Watts, both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court
have, in specific settings, given article I, section 14 a
different interpretation than that given to the fourth amendment.
However, it is clear that article I, section 14 may be given an
interpretation different from that given to the fourth amendment
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only under the limited circumstances enunciated in Watts.
Moreover, in each instance where Utah's courts have departed from
federal search and seizure standards, they have done so because
of inconsistencies or confusion in the federal analysis.

See

State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) (rejecting United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)); State v. Larocco, 794
P.2d 460, 466 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (rejecting New York
v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986)); State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141, 149
(Utah App. 1991), cert, granted, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah Feb. 5, 1993)
(clarifying Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990)).
Considered collectively, Watts, Larocco, Sims and
Thompson make clear that article I, section 14 should generally
be interpreted as is the fourth amendment by the federal courts.
Only in those instances where the federal courts have vacillated
between various standards such that "the vagaries of inconsistent
interpretations [of] the fourth amendment" Watts, 750 P.2d at n.
8, have become so prevalent that it is necessary "to simplify . .
. the search and seizure rules so that they can be more easily
followed by the police and the courts and, at the same time,
provide the public with consistent and predictable protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures," Larocco, 794 P.2d at
469, should Utah courts embark upon an interpretative journey
into the Utah Constitution.
The federal standard for determining voluntariness of a
consent to search has been well-established since the United
29

States Supreme Court decision in Schneckloth.

Although

Schneckloth has been the target of some criticism among
commentators14, that criticism has remained almost exclusively
academic.

As demonstrated in the next section, Schneckloth

continues to enjoy near universal acceptance among state courts.
3. Nearly Every Jurisdiction Continues to Follow the
Totality of Circumstances Test for Voluntariness
Enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
The final factor identified by this Court in Bobo for
the analysis of novel state constitutional arguments is citation
to authority from other states supporting the particular
construction urged by counsel.15

Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1272-73 n.5.

Under this "sibling state" approach, particular attention should
be given to those states whose constitutions served as models for
the Utah Constitution, as well as to authority from states in the
same geographical region.16

See State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221,

500 A.2d 233, 237 (1985) (describing "sibling state" approach)
(cited as proper model of state constitutional analysis in, State

14

See, e.g., 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise On
The Fourth Amendment, § 8.1(a), at 152-154 (2d ed. 1987). But
see The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 55, 218-19
(1973) (although critical of some of the Court's reasoning, the
author concludes "the ultimate result in Bustamonte appears to be
correct").
15

For the Court's convenience, the search and seizure
provisions from the constitutions of each of the fifty states is
provided in Addendum C of this brief.
"Defendant totally fails to meet this portion of the Bobo
briefing rule. Nowhere in his brief does he cite to the
positions of other states in support of his novel approach to
this issue.
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v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986)).

Commentators have

identified several states whose constitutions served as models
for the framers of the Utah Constitution: Illinois, Iowa, Nevada,
New York, and Washington.17

A review of decisions from the

courts of these states indicates that none have adopted positions
that support defendant's proposed interpretation of article I,
section 14.
Even before the Supreme Court decided Schneckloth,
Illinois refused "to require that the People show that the
consenting party was advised of rights secured by the fourth
amendment, [but] the failure to do so is a factor bearing on the
understanding [of the] nature of the consent."

People v.

Haskell, 41 111.2d 25, 31, 241 N.E.2d 430, 434 (1968) (citations
omitted).

Illinois now applies the voluntariness standard

articulated in Schneckloth.

See, e.g.. People v. Sesmas, 591

N.E.2d 918, 922 (Ill.App.3d 1992) ("Moreover, ignorance of
knowledge of the right to refuse to consent does not vitiate the
voluntariness of the consent but is merely a factor to
consider.") (citations omitted).
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court has stated that
the search and seizure provisions of the
United States and Iowa Constitutions contain
identical language. Consequently, they
generally are "deemed to be identical in
scope, import, and purpose."

17

See Wallentine, supra at 282 and authorities cited
therein.
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State v. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Iowa 1986) (citations
omitted).

In keeping with this general rule, Iowa adopted

Schneckloth and expressly noted that "knowledge of the right to
refuse consent is only one factor to be considered in answering
the question of voluntariness."

State v. Eae. 274 N.W.2d 350,

353 (Iowa 1979) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S. Ct.
at 2047-48).
Nevada has likewise adopted the Schneckloth standard
for determining voluntariness of consent.
P.2d 212, 214 (Nev. 1979).

Reese v. State, 596

In so doing, the Nevada Supreme Court

recognized that one state, New Jersey, had departed from
Schneckloth under its state constitution.

Id. (citing State v.

Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975)).

Nevertheless, the

Reese court reaffirmed its adherence to Schneckloth, noting that
"[t]his court has never indicated that a different standard
should apply in this state, but is in accord with the rule that
voluntariness [of consent] is a question of fact to be determined
from all the circumstances."

id. (citations omitted).

Washington does not appear to have expressly considered
departing from Schneckloth.

Rather, it has consistently applied

the totality of circumstances test for determining voluntariness
of consent.

See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 734 P.2d 516, 519-520

(Wash. 1987) (citing Schneckloth and several Washington cases in
which Schneckloth was applied).
While Wallentine cites the New York Constitution as a
possible influence on the framers of the article I, section 14,
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Wallentine, supra at 282, he ignores the fact that New York's
search and seizure provision, article I, section 12, was not
adopted until 1938.

Clearly a provision adopted more than forty

after Utah's constitution could not have influenced article I,
section 14.
Therefore, the fact that New York appears to be the
most willing of the states to depart from federal search and
seizure law, is irrelevant to an interpretation of article I,
section 14. Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution
contains two paragraphs, the first of which is identical to the
fourth amendment.18

However, despite their apparent willingness

to depart from federal search and seizure law in other contexts,
even New York courts continue to apply the Schneckloth standard
for determining voluntariness of consent to search.

See, e.g.,

People v. Khatib. 555 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1010 (Sup. 1990) (applying
Schneckloth and citing several other New York cases in which
Schneckloth was applied).
Just as none of the states whose constitutions may have
served as models for the Utah constitution have adopted positions
that support defendant's proposed interpretation of article I,
section 14, neither have any of the western states departed from
Schneckloth. See, e.g., State v. Paredes. 810 P.2d 607, 610

18

According to Wallentine, the second paragraph of Article
I, Section 12 addresses electronic surveillance, and closely
parallels an applicable federal statute. Wallentine, supra at
note 103 (citing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988)).
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(Ariz. App. 1991)19; People v. James, 561 P.2d 1135, 114, 137
Cal.Rptr. 447, 455 (1977); State v. Bedolla, 806 P.2d 588, 593
n.2 (N.M. App. 1991); Stamper v. State. 662 P.2d 82, 87 (Wyo.
1983); (all applying Schneckloth).

Even before Schneckloth was

decided, a number of western states rejected the suggestion that
police be required to inform a suspect that he had the right to
refuse the officer's request for consent to search. See
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231 n.14, 93 S. Ct. at 2050 n.14 (citing
cases from California, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska
and Oregon, among others).

None of these states appear to have

since departed from their original positions or from Schneckloth.
More importantly, several of Utah's neighboring states
have expressly refused to depart from Schneckloth under their
state constitutions.

See, e.g., People v. Hayhurst. 571 P.2d

721, 724 n.4 (Colo. 1977) (refusing to require Miranda-type
warning under the state constitution and citing several preSchneckloth Colorado decisions for the same proposition); State
v. Christofferson, 610 P.2d 515, 517 (Idaho 1980) (refusing to
require defendants be advised of their right to refuse consent
under state constitution and reaffirming its adoption of the
federal standard); State v. Stemple, 646 P.2d 539, 541 (Mont.

19

gee also State v. Knaubert. 550 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Ariz.
1976) ("Defendant has cited no authority [for the proposition]
that the Arizona Constitution requires that the record show that
an in custody defendant knew that he had the right to refuse to
consent to the search. Absent such authority, we are unwilling
to apply a more stringent requirement under the Arizona
Constitution than is imposed by the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.") (emphasis added).
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1982) (refusing to impose a stricter standard under the Montana
Constitution than that required under Schneckloth); State v.
Flores, 570 P.2d 965, 968 (Or. 1977) (declining to interpret
state constitution more restrictively than fourth amendment and
rejecting Miranda-type warning requirement).
Expanding the scope of inquiry to include the rest of
the states, it is clear that Schneckloth enjoys near universal
acceptance.

At least four additional states have refused to

interpret their state constitutions as requiring a more stringent
standard of voluntariness than that required under the fourth
amendment.

See Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 169 (Alaska 1979)

(After noting that the language of article I, section 14 of the
Alaska Constitution is almost identical to the fourth amendment,
the court held that

fI

[t]he Court in Schneckloth rejected the

argument [that the state must prove that defendant knew of his
right to refuse consent to the search], and we do not believe
that the Alaska Constitution requires a different standard for
noncustodial consent searches."); King v. State, 557 S.W.2d 386
(Ark. 1977) ("In our view the Schneckloth standard of required
proof in consent to search is adequate under the terms of our
constitution.

Art. 2, § 15, Ark. Const. (1874)."); State v.

Osborne, 402 A.2d 493, 497 (N.H. 1979) (refusing to impose
heavier burden under the New Hampshire Constitution than that
required under Schneckloth); State v. Rodaers. 349 N.W.2d 453,
459 (Wis. 1984) (declining to adopt different definition of
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consent under state constitution than that required under fourth
amendment).
Although one court has said that "it would be a good
policy for police officers to advise persons that they have a
right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search [even though
that procedure is not] constitutionally required," Osborne. 402
A.2d at 498,20 the Schneckloth standard for determining
voluntariness of consent enjoys overwhelming acceptance among the
states.

See also Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772, 781 n.5

(Tex.Cr.App. 1988) (noting that warning of right to refuse
consent is "good police practice," but nevertheless embracing
Schneckloth).

Moreover, the State has been unable to find even a

single court that has decided to require law enforcement to give
suspects a Miranda-type consent warning.21

Indeed, it appears

that only two states, Mississippi and New Jersey, have departed
from Schneckloth.

See State v. Ellis, 586 A.2d 876 (N.J.Super.

1990), and State v. Johnson. 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1977) (under the
New Jersey Constitution, the validity of a consent to search,
even in a noncustodial situation, must be measured in terms of
waiver, an essential element of which is knowledge of the right

20

But as previously noted, even the court in Osborne
refused to depart from Schneckloth under its state constitution.
Osborne, 402 A.2d at 497.
21

After Miranda was decided, at least one commentator
predicted that courts would require that police give a "Mirandatype" warning when requesting consent to search. See Wilberding,
"Miranda-Type Warnings for Consent Searches?", 47 N.D.L.Rev. 281,
284 (1971). Nevertheless, the concept of Miranda-type warnings
for consent searches has been universally rejected by the courts.
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to refuse consent); Lonastreet v. State, 592 So.2d 16, 19 (Miss.
1991) (fI[V]alid consent to an otherwise illegal search must be
accompanied by a knowledgeable waiver of a person's
constitutional right not to be searched. . . . In other words,
for a search which is based on consent alone, it is necessary
that the person searched be aware of the right to refuse under
the law.") (citing Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 550-51 (Miss.
1983)).

Neither New Jersey nor Mississippi have, however, gone

so far as to require that police give a Miranda-type warning like
that proposed by defendant, and, as noted above, numerous courts
have rejected that concept.
The great weight of authority militates against
departing from the voluntariness of consent standard articulated
in Schneckloth.

The State already must meet the heavy burden of

proving voluntariness.

To impose the additional burden of

proving actual knowledge of the right to refuse consent to a
search will unnecessarily hinder law enforcement because it will
enable defendants who have in fact voluntarily consented to a
search to later claim that they did not know they could refuse to
consent.

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 230. Although defendant

suggests that a Miranda-type warning would resolve this problem,
such a warning unnecessarily shackles law enforcement.
231.

Id. at

Finally, while some commentators have criticized the

voluntariness standard articulated in Schneckloth. the totality
of circumstance test has been effectively applied since its
inception by nearly every jurisdiction in the country.
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Unlike

the issues addressed in Thompson, Larocco, and Sims, the analysis
of consent searches is not hopelessly complicated by "the
vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given the fourth
amendment by the federal courts," Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8, or
confounded by the United States Supreme Court's "vacillation"
between two diverse standards.

Larocco, 794 P.2d at 467.

Consequently, there is no justification for departing from
Schneckloth under the criterion

established by the Utah Supreme

Court in Watts and this Court should follow the general rule of
adhering to federal search and seizure law.
POINT V
IF THIS COURT DECIDES TO ADOPT A DIFFERENT
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A
CONSENT TO SEARCH THAN THE VOLUNTARINESS
STANDARD ESTABLISHED IN SCHNECKLOTH. THEN
THIS COURT SHOULD EXPRESSLY HOLD THAT THE NEW
RULE WILL APPLY ONLY PROSPECTIVELY.
If this Court decides to depart from Schneckloth and
either requires that the State prove that a defendant knew he had
a right to refuse a request to search or imposes a Miranda-type
warning requirement on state law enforcement, those requirements
should be applied prospectively only and not retroactively.

The

Utah Supreme Court in Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983),
adopted three factors to guide determinations of whether a new
standard should be applied retroactively: 1) the purpose to be
served by the new rule; 2) the extent of reliance on the old
rule; and 3) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new rule. Andrews, 677 P.2d at 91
(citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 708, 713 (1987)).
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Applying these factors to the state constitutional analysis
proposed by defendant indicates that neither the "knowledge
standard" nor a Miranda-type warning should be applied
retroactively.
A Miranda-type warning of the right to refuse consent
would be prophylactic because the warning would not itself create
any rights, but would merely serve to ensure that suspects are
aware of their rights.

Such a prophylactic purpose "does not

favor retroactivity," Andrews, 677 P.2d at 93, because it does
not implicate the basic fairness of a trial.22

Similarly,

requiring the State to prove that the defendant knew of his right
to refuse consent does not fundamentally alter the right
protected at trial.

Consequently, because application of this

new rule would serve as a guide for law enforcement in obtaining
consent in future cases, but does not provide a new right for
defendants at trial, this court should look to the remaining two
factors which strongly militate in favor of prospective
application only.
Both of the proposed new rules would represent a clear
break from existing standards that could not have been
anticipated by law enforcement.

Law enforcement have long relied

on decisions from Utah's courts that have held that knowledge of
the right to refuse to consent is only one factor in determining

22

As noted by the Supreme Court, "[t]he protections of the
Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order, and have
nothing whatever to do with promoting the ascertainment of truth
at a criminal trial." Schneckloth. 98 S.Ct. at 2055.
39

voluntariness.

No other state has imposed a Miranda-type

warning, and, as explained above, several have rejected such a
requirement.

Also, although New Jersey and Mississippi have

opted to require proof of knowledge of the right to refuse
consent, they are the only states that have done so.

In short,

the Court's Schneckloth standard has been the well established
basis for determining validity of consent for many years, and law
enforcement officials have relied on that standard.
Consequently, the proposed "knowledge standard" and Miranda-type
warnings would each mark a clear break from existing law.
Generally, whenever such a clear break occurs, the Supreme Court
"invariably has gone on to find such a newly minted principle
nonretroactive." United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549, 102
S.Ct. 2579, 2587 (1982) .23
Retroactive application of any new standard would have
an adverse effect on the administration of justice in Utah.

In

Stovall v. Denno, the Supreme Court looked at the adverse effect
that retroactive application of the Wade and Gilbert standards on
identification evidence would have on the administration of
justice and found that "[i]t is . . . very clear that retroactive
application . . . 'would seriously disrupt the administration of
our criminal laws.'"

388 U.S. 293, 300 (1966)(citation omitted).

23

See also Johnson, 346 A.2d at 68 (in adopting the rule
that the state must prove suspects were aware of their right to
refuse consent, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that its
"decision [was] to have prospective effect, applying only to
searches based on consent which take place after the date of
[this] opinion").
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That is likewise true in this instance because retroactive
application would require collateral inquiry into every consent
search case in the state in order to determine if the defendant
knew he could refuse the request to search.

Opening the doors to

collateral attack on every consent search in Utah would seriously
impair the administration of justice in the state.
The State already bears the heavy burden of proving
that a consent to search was voluntarily given.

While the

proposed standards do not fundamentally alter the rights of
defendants at trial, both represent a clear break with past
precedent and, if applied retroactively, would have an adverse
effect on the administration of justice in Utah.

Consequently,

should this Court adopt either the "knowledge standard" of proof
or a Miranda-type warning, it should expressly hold that they
apply prospectively only.24
CONCLUSION
Deputy Barney lawfully stopped defendant's car based on
his observation of fishtailing.

When he subsequently smelled a

common drug masking agent, the deputy reasonably asked if
defendant was transporting narcotics.

24

Deputy Barney's subsequent

If this Court decides to create such a rule, the question
as to what the proper remedy for any violation of that new state
constitutional rule can only be properly addressed after
supplemental briefing by the parties. Likewise, if this Court
creates a new rule, the proper remedy in this case would be a
remand to the trial court to allow the State to attempt to
demonstrate whether or not defendant did in fact know of his
right to refuse consent.
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warrantless search of defendant's car and trunk was proper based
on defendant's voluntary consent.
Defendant failed to demonstrate a subjective interest
of privacy in the luggage.

The trial court correctly concluded

that this failure precluded defendant from complaining of any
constitutional violation.

This Court could also affirm the trial

court's denial of the motion to suppress based on the fact that
once defendant opened the trunk Deputy Barney smelled marijuana
and had probable cause to search the luggage.
Because defendant failed to show that his search
consent was preceded by any police illegality, the trial court
properly declined to engage in an attenuation analysis below.

It

is similarly unnecessary for this Court to engage in an
attenuation analysis on appeal.
Finally, defendant's claim under the state constitution
fails to demonstrate any necessity to deviate from federal fourth
amendment analysis.

However, if this Court decides to impose

this additional requirement on the State, that requirement should
only be applied prospectively.

Accordingly, this Court should

uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
and affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S

day of November, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

RALPH E. CHAMNESS
Assistant Attorney General
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R. Don Brown #0464
Sevier County Attorney
Sevier County Courthouse
250 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone< (801) 896-6812
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

i
Plaintiff,

VS.

GREGORY MORRIS MATISON, aka
GERALD MORRIS, aka MORRIS
GREGORY MATISON,
DOB:
Defendant.

«
ii

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

i
ii

Case No. 921600010FS
Judge Don V. Tibbs

i

This Batter came before the Court on July 14, 1992, on Defendant's
Motion to Suppress. The Motion was argued by counsel for Defendant, Gil
Athay, and R. Don Brown for the State. The parties have also submitted posthearing memoranda. Having duly considered the evidence and arguments of the
parties, including recent federal and Utah decisional law, the Court now makes
and enters the followingi
F P D P G S Of ?ACT
1. On January 14, 1992, Deputy Phil Barney was traveling to the
Sallna interchange of 1*70 when he observed a vehicle which had just come off
the eastbound lanes of 1-70 at such exit.
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2.

Deputy Barney observed the vehicle "fish tall" as it cane onto

the access road from the freeway and then the vehicle stopped at a gas
station/convenience store.
3. Deputy Barney drove up to the freeway underpass where the
vehicle had been out of control to determine whether the action was the result
of icy conditions and observed that the road was dry*
4.

The officer observed that the driver of the vehicle was still

stopped at the business establishment and commenced traffic enforcement
activities on 1-70 east of Salina.
5. Upon subsequently observing the vehicle traveling eastbound out
of Salina and knowing that there are no services for 110 miles in such
direction, Deputy Barney decided to stop the vehicle to determine whether the
driver was impaired or why the driver was unable to control the vehicle at the
Salina interchange.
6.

The officer stopped the vehicle at It33 p.m. as shown on the

video tape recording of the scene of the stop.
7. When the officer approached the Defendant's vehicle, the
Defendant asked, "What am I being stopped for? Am I speeding?"
8. Deputy Barney responded by indicating that he would explain in a
moment and asked for the license and registration to the vehicle.
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9. At It34s14 p.m., Deputy Barney explained the reason for the stop
and the Defendant stated that he had been having trouble with his cruise
control and that was why he was unable to control the vehicle.
10. Deputy Barney had at this point swelled the odor of fresh
ground coffee, an ingredient commonly used to mask the odor of raw marijuana,
and noted the extreme nervousness of the Defendant who had offered an
unreasonable explanation of his traveling in a vehicle for which he was not
the owner.
11. Deputy Barney asked if the vehicle contained firearms or drugs
and after receiving a negative response asked, "May I look in the vehicle?"
12. The Defendant consented at It34*35 p.m.
13. At It35s50 p.m., Deputy Barney asked the Defendant, "Would you
pop the trunk," and the Defendant opened the trunk.
14. Upon observing the suitcases in the trunk and smelling the
suitcase, Deputy Barney handcuffed the Defendant and arrested him at 1:36:38
p.m.
15. At It38102, Deputy Barney opened one of the cases sufficiently
to observe marijuana.
16. The vehicle was found to contain 138.25 pounds of marijuana.
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gONCI^TON? Qf frAW
1. The Defendant submitted no evidence or testimony regarding his
claim of interest in the substance seized or the contents of the vehicle and
he lacks standing to challenge the search.
2.

The initial traffic stop of the vehicle was pursuant to a

legitimate law enforcement function.
3.

The Defendant, upon being asked about the presence of firearms

or drugs, voluntarily consented to open the vehicle for inspection.
4.

The officer used no threats or coercion and the Defendant's

actions were voluntary.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied.
SIGNED BY MY HAND this

/(

day of «E|fwt, 1992.

H*TT.THg rpyjffCATE
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was placed in the United
States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully
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thereon fully prepaid on the

)4^

day of September, 1992, addressed as

followsi
Mr. D. Gilbert Athay
Attorney at Law
72 East Fourth South, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mr. R. Don Brown
Sevier County Attorney
250 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
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ADDENDUM B

I. HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION IN UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The following history may be found at the Utah State Archives
under the title "Constitution State of Deseret and Utah
Constitutions, Memorials to Congress, and Proceedings of Convention
1849-1959," Microfilm Document No. 080979, C. Reel I (1849-1895),
Utah State Archives No. 700-0000-1400:
1. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State
of Deseret (1849):
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
2. Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of the State of
Deseret (1872) :
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
seizures and searches, shall not be violated; and not
warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place or
places to be searched, and the person or persons, and
thing or things, to be seized.
3. Article I, Section 16 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah (1882) :
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
seizures and searches, shall not be violated; and not
warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place or
places to be searched, and the person or persons, and
thing or things, to be seized.
4. Article I, Section 19 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah (1887) :
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
seizures and searches, shall not be violated, and not
warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
5. Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah (1895) (current provision):
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures
and searches shall not be violated; and not warrant shall

issue but on probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized.
II, FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, house, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

ADDENDUM C

Alabama
Article I, Sec. 5
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and possessions from unreasonable seizures or
searches, and no warrants shall issue to search any place
or to seize any person or thing without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation.
Alaska
Article I, Sec. 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and other property against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Arizona
Article 2, Sec. 8
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or
his home invaded, without authority of law.
Arkansas
Article 2, Sec. 15
The right of the people of this State to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrant shall issue, except upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or thing to be seized.
California
Article I, Sec. 13
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant may issue, except upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons and things to be
seized.

Colorado
Article 2, Sec. 7
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and no warrant to search any place or seize any
person or things shall issue without describing the place
to be searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as
near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation reduced to writing.
Connecticut
Article First, Sec. 7
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and no warrant to search any place or to seize
any person or things shall issue without describing them
as nearly as may be, or the person or thing to be seized,
as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation.
Delaware
Article I, Sec. 6
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing them
as particularly as may be; nor then, unless there be
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.
Florida
Article I, Sec. 12
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception
of private communications by any means, shall not be
violated.
No warrant shall be issued except upon
probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly
describing the place or places to be searched, the person
or persons, thing or things to be seized, the
communication to be intercepted, and the nature of the
evidence to be obtained. This right shall be construed
in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of
this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such
articles or information would be inadmissible under

decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing
the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Georgia
Article I, Sec. 13
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, except upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place, or places to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Hawaii
Article I, Section 7
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and invasions of privacy shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized, or communications sought
to be intercepted.
Idaho
Article I, Sec. 17
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by
affidavit, particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized.
Illinois
Article I, Sec. 6
The people shall have the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and other possessions against
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or
interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices
or other means. No warrant shall issue without probable
cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

Indiana
Article I, Sec. 6
The right of the people to be secure in their person,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Iowa
Article I, Sec. 11
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Kansas
Bill of Rights, Sec. 15
The right of the people to be secure in their persons and
property against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall be inviolate; and no warrant shall issue but on
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or property to be seized.
Kentucky
Bill of Rights, Sec. 10
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions, from unreasonable search and
seizure; and no warrant shall issue to search any place,
or seize any person or thing, without describing them as
nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation.
Louisiana
Article I, Sec. 5
Every person shall be secure in his person, property,
communications, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.
No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported

by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, the persons or things to be seized,
and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any
person adversely affected by a search or seizure
conducted in violation of this Section shall have
standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate
court.
Maine
Article I, Section 5
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions from all unreasonable searches and
seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, shall issue without a special
designation of the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized, nor without probable causesupported by oath or affirmation.
Maryland
Declaration of Rights, Article 26
That all warrants without oath or affirmation, to search
suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are
grevious[grievous] and oppressive; and all general
warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend
suspected persons, without naming or describing the
place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought
not to be granted.
Massachusetts
Part I, Article 14
Every subject has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches and seizures, or his person, his
houses, his papers, and all his possessions.
All
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right if the
cause or foundation of them be not previously supported
by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant
to a civil officer, to make searches in suspected places,
or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize
their property, be not accompanied with a special
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest,
or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued but in
cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws.

Michigan
Constitution of 1963, Article I, Sec. 11
The person, houses, papers, and possessions of every
person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any
person or things shall issue without describing them, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
The provisions of this section shall not be construed to
bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic
drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous
weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage
of any dwelling house in this state.
Minnesota
Article I, Sec. 10
The right of the people to be secure in their person,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Mississippi
Article III, Sec. 23
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and
possessions, from unreasonable seizure or search; and no
warrant shall be issued without probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, specially designating the place
to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
Missouri
Article I, Sec. 15
That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing the
place to be searched, or the person or thing seized, as
nearly as may be; nor without probable cause, supported
by written oath or affirmation.

Montana
Article II, Sec. 11
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects from unreasonable searches and
seizures. No warrant to search any place, or seize any
person or thing shall issue without describing the place
to be searched or the person or thing to be seized, or
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation
reduced to writing.
Nebraska
Article I, Sec. 7
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
Nevada
Article I, Sec. 18
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or persons, and
thing or things to be seized.
New Hampshire
Part First, Article 19
Every subject hath a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his
houses, his papers, and all his possessions. Therefore,
all warrants to search suspected places, or arrest a
person for examination or trial in prosecutions for
criminal matters, are contrary to this right, if the
cause or foundation of them be not previously supported
by oath or affirmation; and if the order, in a warrant to
a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or
to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize
their property, be not accompanied with a special
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest,
or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued; but in
cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by law.

New Jersey
Article I, Sec.
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the papers and things to be
seized.
New Mexico
Article 2, Sec. 10
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing the
place to be searched, or the persons or things to be
seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation.
New York
Article I, Sec. 12
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
interception of telephone and telegraph communications
shall not be violated, and ex parte orders or warrants
shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is
reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may
be thus obtained, and identifying the particular means of
communication, and particularly describing the person or
persons whose communications are to be intercepted and
the purpose thereof.
North Carolina
Article I, Sec. 20
General warrants, whereby any officer or other person may
be commanded to search suspected places without evidence
of the act committed, or to seize any person or persons
not named, whose offense is not particularly described
and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and

shall not be granted.
North Dakota
Article I, Sec. 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons and things to be
seized.
Ohio
Article I, Sec. 14
The right of the people to be secure in their person,
houses, papers, and possess ?*.s, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shal not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upor. probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Oklahoma
Article 2, Sec. 30
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches or seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and describe , &s particularly as
may be the place to be searched, ana the person or thing
to be seized.
Oregon
Article I, Sec. 9
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Pennsylvania
Article I, Sec. 8
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and possessions from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize
any person or things shall issue without describing them
as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the
affiant.
Rhode Island
Article I, Sec. 6
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
papers and possessions, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue, but on complaint in writing, upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and describing as
nearly as may be, the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
South Carolina
Article I, Sec. 10
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, the
person or thing to be seized, and the information to be
obtained.
South Dakota
Article VI, Sec. 11
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
affidavit, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Tennessee
Article I, Sec. 7
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer
may be commanded to search suspected places, without
evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any person or
persons not named, whose offences are not particularly
described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to
liberty and ought not to be granted.
Texas
Article I, Sec. 9
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions from all unreasonable seizures or
searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing them
as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation.
Utah
Article I, Sec. 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Vermont
Article I, Sec. 11
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their
houses, papers, and possessions, free from search or
seizure; and therefore warrants, witnout oath or
affirmation first made affording sufficient foundation
for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded or required to search suspected places, or to
seize any person or persons, his, her or their property,
not particularly described, are contrary to that right,
and ought not to be granted.

Virginia
Article I, Sec. 10
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger
may be commanded to search suspected places without
evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or
persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly
described and supported by evidence, are grievous and
oppressive, and ought not to be granted.
Washington
Article I, Sec. 7
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or
his home invaded, without authority of law.
West Virginia
Article III, Sec. 6
The rights of the citizens to be secure in their houses,
persons, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. No warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, or the person or thing to be seized.
Wisconsin
Article I, Sec.
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Wyoming
Article I, Sec. 4
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by
affidavit, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

